周波：假如我国不费一枪一弹就登上国际之巅，将是人类历史上的奇观
编者按：国际闻名的Munk Debate（芒克辩论会）日前播出了芒克辩论会主席、加拿大闻名主持人鲁德亚德·格里福茨（Rudyard Griffiths）和清华大学战略与安全研究中心研究员周波的对话。两边就台湾问题为何是我国的首要安全关心、我国与其他亚洲国家的南海争端，以及乌克兰抵触的阅历阅历等进行了深度评论。
北京对话（Beijing Club for International Dialogue）对此进行实录翻译，以飨读者。
【翻译：李泽西 核译：韩桦】
鲁德亚德·格里福茨：周波，欢迎来到芒克对话。
周波：你好，很快乐参加对话。
鲁德亚德·格里福茨：您是否以为台湾日益不确定的位置是我国现在最大的国家安全关心？
周波：台湾问题一向是我国最大的国家安全关心。原因其实很简单：关于国际上一切国家的戎行来说，疆域和国防都是头等大事。我国的不同之处在于，作为一个大国，咱们还肩负着其他一些任务。我国的人物十分共同。首要，作为一个大国，却还没有共同，这在大国中极为稀有。此外，我国要走出去，在海外有许多利益，因而咱们议论的是一个如此杂乱的大国。
关于大陆我国人来说，期望与台湾平和共同是一种自然而然的情感。接下来的问题是：首要，我国大陆是否正在失掉耐性？这其实是一个很重要的问题。我想说，咱们依然是有耐性的。比方，2022年10月的中共二十大，习近平主席谈到台湾问题时指出“咱们坚持以最大诚心、尽最大尽力争夺平和共同的远景”。
南希·佩洛西在此之前窜访台湾时，我国大陆戎行在台湾岛周围进行了大规模演习，实弹发射导弹等等。当蔡英文在加州会晤麦卡锡时，咱们又进行了演习，但这次演习仅仅模仿进犯，没有运用实弹。这极点奇妙，阐明咱们知道怎么处理这种状况，咱们的办法是慎重和有分寸的。
佩洛西2022年8月窜访台湾后，解放军在台湾岛周边进行军演（图源：新华社）
鲁德亚德·格里福茨：美国越来越多地向台湾供给顶级兵器系统，尤其是许诺供给地对海导弹，我国大陆的国家安全部分对此怎么看？美国的这些行为是否被视为寻衅行为，或许仅仅被视为一种滋扰，与曩昔的行为无异，因而中方也不会比曩昔分外注重？
周波：我以为这些行为必定被以为具有寻衅性，但问题是，它们影响究竟有多大？我不以为美方的这些举动会有什么了不得。
比方，台湾最近制作了首艘本乡潜艇，往后总共再制作大约八艘。但这些潜艇对全体形势有多大影响呢？依据我作为武士的阅历，我知道潜艇比飞机要杂乱得多。我来自空军，虽然不是飞行员，但我知道，飞机一般只需在飞行员驾驭多年后才干在技术上完善。这意味着它被出产出来，首要要经过试飞，终究，只需飞行员自己才干告知你究竟存在哪些问题。
因而，我信任台湾自己制作的第一艘潜艇必定存在许多问题。实际上，它的交给进程匆促，因为蔡英文期望这能够成为她的政治遗产。即便他们能顺畅制作8艘潜艇，这又有多大影响？这的确或许会使解放军的决议方案变得杂乱，但总的来说，关于正在日新月异展开的我国戎行而言，这些都微乎其微。
我以为美国现在采纳的战略是把台湾变成一只“豪猪”。但美国真的信任台湾能变成一只强壮的“豪猪”吗？我对此标明置疑。但这契合美国的利益，标明他们支撑所谓的民主，也契合美国军工企业出售兵器的利益，谁会回绝这样一个大发横财的时机呢？我以为，在日益杂乱的中美联络中，美国仅仅将台湾视作一个讨价还价的筹码。
我以为，美国实际上现已从失利中吸取了阅历，做了必定的改动。例如，脱钩现在看起来彻底是无稽之谈，美国挑选改用“去风险”的说法，其实是借用欧盟委员会主席冯德莱恩的说法。但他们为什么称之“去风险”呢？因为“去风险”听起来比较温文，而脱钩明显是不或许的。那“去风险”又是什么意思呢？我以为他们有必要抚躬自问。即便是在半导体和芯片范畴去风险，也是益发困难的工作。这并非中方的要求，而是芯片制作商们正在失掉我国市场，是他们在向白宫施压。
我以为，美国关于“一个我国”方针其实是有许多不同定见的。美国外交联络委员会前主席理查德·哈斯（Richard Haas）写过一篇文章，谈到美国的对华方针应该从战略含糊转向战略明晰。但也有其他学者并不赞同他的观念，因为这种明晰战略或许会让形势变得愈加风险。
为什么会呈现这种争辩呢？我以为这是源自我国不断增强的实力。在曩昔，我国实力不行，当美国坚持方针含糊时，咱们就得猜想他们的实在情绪。可是，因为我国的实力不断增强，美国忧虑除非他们明晰标明会在军事上捍卫台湾，不然大陆很或许会首要对台湾进行冲击。但假如美国转向战略明晰，有些人又忧虑这会自动招来大陆“先下手为强”。因而，美国现在陷入了进退维谷的地步。
再看看美国国内的状况。拜登政府软弱无力，两党极点敌对。从经济方面看，拜登政府做得不错，但你听听特朗普描绘的美国，可谓“尸横遍野”。而在全球规模，“自由民主”准则现已持续式微了17年。这是谁形成的？明显，这与我国或俄罗斯无关。关于像我这样的我国人，或任何人来说，看到美国总统呼吁抗议者占据国会山是令人震惊的。这太难以想象了，相似工作甚至不会产生在非洲。因而，我对美国能否在台湾问题上采纳安稳的对华方针没有多大的决计。
鲁德亚德·格里福茨：你提到了美国政界的争辩；一些共和党人以为美国应该向台湾供给明晰的安全确保，相似于北约内部的第5条许诺。假如这一提议产生，中方会怎么反响？这会被视为寻衅吗？
周波：咱们先来看看关于“一个我国”方针的争辩，或许说关于战略含糊与战略明晰的争辩。终究，他们仍是说“一个我国”。为什么呢？因为他们虽然在掏空这个概念，可是依然将它视为一个大筐，这样对他们自己更为有利，能够从各种不同视点解说什么是“一个我国”。假如他们抛弃“一个我国”，那当然对他们和咱们来说都是地动山摇。
我以为能够从佩洛西窜访台湾的进程看出我国大陆的决计。有人问我，假如美国众议院新议长“拜访”台湾，会产生什么？我说，我不知道，咱们当然会有多个存案方案，但凭我的直觉猜想，咱们的反响必定更激烈。不然，咱们怎么告知自己，咱们在做正确的事？
我不以为他们真的会以这种方法公开支撑“台独”，但我彻底信任，不断强壮起来的我国大陆有更多的手法来处理这个问题。
1月15日，台湾大选刚刚完毕第二天，太平洋岛国瑙鲁同台湾“绝交”
鲁德亚德·格里福茨：美国对台姿势的争辩，也涉及到美国的南太平洋战略的大布景，即"奥库斯"（AUKUS）。环绕这一战略，美国正尽力与日本、菲律宾，以及必定程度上与韩国展开更严密的安全联络。我国安全部分对此有何观念？是否有一种被“步步紧逼”的感觉，是否有一种对手在共同对立我国兴起、我国扩张的感觉？
周波：让我先谈谈美国的大战略。我以为，美国把要点放在亚太区域，或许美国人所谓的印太区域，实际上反映出美国的实力的确在下降。美国官员常常议论盟友和同伴的重要性，因为单靠他们自己的力气是不行的，有必要依托这些盟友和同伴。
你提到了各方和各种不同的状况。我以为，整体而言，这是美国测验在该区域遏止我国。问题是，在我阅读了美国的印太战略之后，我发现他们方针许多，但东西不行。
没有哪个国家蠢到挑选非黑即白。我以为，国际现已进入到了一个一切国家都在就事选边、而不是就边选边的年代。提到日本，假如台湾海峡产生抵触，日本有公约责任在后勤补给方面支撑美国，日本不得不这样做。
至于澳大利亚，现在还很难说。不到终究一刻，你无法知道一个人究竟会怎么做。假如你研究一下澳大利亚的前史，会发现这个国家十分风趣，它总是在其他地方打他人的仗，在土耳其的加利波利、阿富汗或远离澳大利亚大陆的某地，只需二战期间日本轰炸达尔文，使澳大利亚本乡直接遭到战役影响。
但现在，澳大利亚1/3的出口都流向了我国。他们的确正在购买八艘潜艇，但这些潜艇影响又有多大呢？就像台湾的潜艇相同，它们或许会使我国政府的决议方案变得愈加杂乱，但这并不是多大事，因为就舰艇数量而言，咱们现已是国际上最多的国家了。这八艘潜艇需求至少十几年才干完结交给，到时我国公民解放军必定会变得愈加强壮。我以为这与莫里森政府有很大联络。现在，阿尔巴尼政府在进行一些改动。因而，整个形势并非非黑即白。
菲律宾的状况很有意思，因为马科斯总统的对华方针好像与其上一任截然不同。我细心想过，究竟为什么会这样呢？杜特尔特总统自己也支撑对菲律宾有利的南海裁定案判决，但他采纳友华情绪明显使菲律宾得到许多优点。不过杜特尔特并不常常提及南海问题，他挑选为了其他利益而与我国坚持杰出联络。
但提到马科斯总统，我就很难了解了。我以为这或许与他的个人布景有关，因为他与美国的联络比较严密。而基本上一切菲律宾高档军官都或多或少有过美国训练阅历。不过，这其实仍是说不通，因为我国从未要挟过要对南海的任何声索国运用武力。
在台湾问题上，我国拟定了或许采纳非平和手法的三个前提条件。但在南海问题上，我国从未要挟过任何其他国家。因而，我很难了解菲律宾政府为什么忽然铺开九个基地供美国运用，这其实是说不通的。现实上，这会让菲律宾面对愈加风险的局势，因为假如美国人把这些基地用作前沿阵地，那么菲律宾的疆土当然就会成为冲击方针，这契合菲律宾的利益吗？
菲律宾原美军基地与上一年新设美军基地比照图（图源：《日经亚洲》）
鲁德亚德·格里福茨：我国领导人从乌克兰战役中汲取了哪些阅历？有一种观念以为，普京之所以侵略乌克兰，部分原因是他以为北约和西方国家在装备乌克兰，支撑不契合俄罗斯利益的政治运动和人物，而因为乌克兰接近莫斯科和俄罗斯的其他决议方案中心，以至于乌克兰成为俄罗斯的安全隐患。我国是否忧虑，乌克兰呈现的这些状况或许在台湾或南海区域重现，东欧的前史有或许在亚洲重演？
周波：就乌克兰战役而言，假如两年前的普京能够预知未来，我以为他或许会采纳不同的战略，他是否还会发动战役，我就不知道了。当然，他这样做是有原因的。现实上，从戈尔巴乔夫到叶利钦和普京，历届苏联和俄罗斯领导人都曾正告过北约不要扩张。因而，普京不是第一个正告北约的人，但他是第一个采纳行为的人。现实证明，俄军作战才能仍是十分具有耐性的，虽然他们一开始打得并不好。
我不以为这与台湾问题有任何直接联络，国际上有180多个国家供认台湾问题是我国的内政。正如我一开始所说的，我信任我国政府仍有耐性。华盛顿有些人以为，台海抵触不可避免，我对此不太认同。即便是美国国防部长奥斯汀都不这么以为。我到会了2023年的香格里拉对话，其间令我形象最深的是奥斯汀说台海抵触并非火烧眉毛，也绝非不可避免。此前，美国一些将军宣告了自己的观念，称我国大陆在2025年或2027年前必定会对台动武。可是，美国国防部长有条件取得一切的情报信息佐证自己的观念，所以奥斯汀在这样一个重要会议上的明晰表态十分重要。
有人说台湾人不愿意与大陆共同。我以为，现实或许并非如此。在新冠疫情迸发之前，大约有150多万台湾人生活在我国大陆，首要会集在上海周边区域，这相当于台湾6%的人口。这意味着，假如我国大陆能为台湾公民供给更好的就业时机和挣钱的时机，这些人就不会那么介意生活在一个准则不同的社会里。
那么大陆能否持续供给这样的环境呢？我信任是能够的。首要，我国经济现已与国际其他区域融为一体，我国有必要敞开，我国也期望持续敞开。只需我国持续敞开，而国际各地因全球化而变得间隔越来越近，人们往来的速度就会越来越快，我国大陆与台湾之间的交融也会变得更快，我信任这种交融是不可避免的。终究，我国大陆从来没有宣告过共同台湾的时刻表。我国大陆仍有耐性。我信任，在台湾问题上，时刻能给咱们带来最好的答案。
鲁德亚德·格里福茨：跟着咱们的对话接近结尾，让我终究问几个微观问题。咱们常常评论我国的兴起，我国作为21世纪文明大国的位置。我国的高档官员是否忧虑，我国的对手美国正试图在军事、科技和经济等范畴阻遏我国的兴起，阻遏你们成为国际上最强壮的国家？这是咱们都在考虑的问题，仍是西方误解了你们的实在主意以及忧虑的问题？
周波：这的确是最庞大问题，其间还能够分出几十个小问题，每个问题都或许极为重要。让我重复一下我之前对他人说过的话。比方说，咱们是否现已进入了一场新的暗斗？我的答复很简单：在咱们避免了一场热战之前，咱们无从知晓，暗斗期间也正是如此，咱们其时每天都在为热战做准备。只需当暗斗完毕了，咱们才松了一口气，哦，好吧，没有迸发热战，所以刚刚产生的是暗斗。我以为，咱们永久无法预知未来，只需阅历了未来，咱们才会知道“已来的和未来的”。
因而，这种问题毫无意义，但中美之间的竞赛与暗斗时两个超级大国的竞赛明显有许多不同之处。我国对美国的方针一向坚持高度共同，基调改变不大，而美国的方针就像过山车，更难猜测。我以为这与他们自己的心态有很大联络。美国过错地以为自己是“山巅之城”。我问咱们，“山巅之城”在哪里？雅典的帕特农神庙是仅有的“山巅之城”，却是空荡的，残缺的。
帕特农神庙
最近，拜登反复强调，美国是不可或缺的。的确如此，但每个国家都是不可或缺的。在我看来，咱们知道在印度洋深处有一个叫马尔代夫的小国就十分重要，这个国家太美了。咱们有必要记住，整个人类社会就像森林相同，有不同的动植物才造就了美丽的国际。美国有NBA、麦当劳、好莱坞，但那又怎样？马尔代夫人没有这些，他们只知道每天早上都会有不计其数的游客来到这儿，告知他们马尔代夫有多美。
回到你最初的问题，迄今为止，我国的兴起一向是十分平和的，这在人类前史上是史无前例的。在我国40多年的兴起进程中，咱们仅有的献身是在中印鸿沟抵触中，中方献身了4名战士，一起印度方面死了20名战士。可是值得注意的是，他们并没有彼此射击，而是在彼此打斗，两支现代戎行以石器年代的方法彼此打斗。为什么会这样呢？咱们都不期望有战役，两边都清楚认识到，在任何状况下，咱们都不应该彼此射击。
回到你的问题，我国的兴起是平和的，或许在不到10年的时刻内，我国就会成为国际上最大的经济体。这将是人类前史上史无前例的，一个国家不费一枪一弹就攀登上国际之巅，这真的令人难以置信。在人类前史上，许多人为各种战役假造出了形形色色的理由。但终究，谁会在乎这些导致人们逝世的理由？看看美国杀死了多少人？他们找出各种托言，但人死不能复生。
我国不同。我国戎行在海外的最大特点是只致力于人道主义行为，无论是维和、冲击海盗仍是救灾。作为一名退役武士，作为一名老兵，我期望我国能持续平和兴起，期望我国公民解放军只在海外展开人道主义行为，只向国际各地的公民供给援助，而不屠戮。一个全球最强壮的国家的戎行在海外行事如此温文，这难道不是国际之幸吗？我不知道国际是否会变得愈加夸姣，但我期望跟着我国的兴起，我国能让国际变得愈加安全。
我国联合国维和部队（图源：新华社）
鲁德亚德·格里福茨：周波，借你吉言来完毕这次精彩的对话真是再好不过了。我十分感谢你今日抽出时刻参加咱们的对话，咱们接纳到了你传递的信息。让咱们持续对话，我以为对话才是咱们所能做的最重要的工作，让人们触摸不同的思维，经过这些思维触发沟通，期望经过沟通达到彼此了解。感谢你今日的讲话。
周波：谢谢你。
以下为英文原文：
Rudyard Griffith: Zhou Bo, welcome to the Munk dialogues.
Zhou Bo:Hi, Rudyard. Nice to be here.
Rudyard Griffith: Would you characterize the increasingly uncertain status of Taiwan as China's biggest national security issue at this time?
Zhou Bo:Well, Taiwan is always the biggest national security concern for China. The reason is very simple, actually. For all the militaries around the world, territorial and national defense is top priority. What makes China different is that it has some other missions, being a major power. China has a very unique role. First, as a major power, it is not reunified. This is extremely rare among major powers. And besides, it has to go abroad, it has interests overseas. So we are talking about a major power that is so sophisticated and complicated.
This is a kind of natural feeling for Chinese, to have a peaceful reunification with Taiwan. Then there are a number of questions. First, are we becoming impatient? This is actually a big question. I would say we're still patient. For example, in October 2022， in President Xi Jinping's report to the Chinese Communist Parties Congress, he still talked about Taiwan issue using two phrases that impress me most. That is, we still have the utmost sincerity, and we would make utmost efforts in the peaceful reunification.
Then, Nancy Pelosi’s visit to Taiwan invited a massive Chinese PLA drill around the island with live firing of missiles and so on so forth. But during Tsai Ingwen’s meeting with Kevin McCarthy in California, we again did exercise, but that exercise was only simulated attack without firing a bullet. So there is great subtlety. That means we know how to handle the situation, or at least our measures are cautious and measured.
Rudyard Griffith: What is the feeling in China amongst the national security establishment regarding the increasing arming of Taiwan by the United States with sophisticated weapon systems, most notably promises of surface to sea missiles that could allow Taiwan, should it wish, in some unfortunate set of circumstances, attack and potentially sink Chinese vessels off its shores？ Are these types of actions by the United States perceived as provocative in China or they are just seen more as a nuisance, a pattern of behavior that you've seen in the past and that you're not giving any more priority to now than you did previously?
Zhou Bo:I think they're certainly considered provocative, but the question is, do they really matter or not? I don't think they would matter tremendously. For example, Taiwan recently made the first indigenous submarine, and they're going to make about eight. But how important are these submarines? From my experience as a serviceman, I know the submarine is much more sophisticated than an aircraft. I came from Air Force. I'm not a pilot, but I know normally aircraft can never be said to be mature until a pilot has flown it for many years. That means it was produced, it was trialed, but then only the pilot can tell you how many problems it really has. So with the first conventional submarine, I'm sure there's a lot of problems. And actually it was delivered in a hurry because this would be a kind of a political legacy of Tsai Ingwen. Even if they could produce 8 submarines, would that matter? Yes, it could complicate decision making in the PLA. But generally speaking, in comparison with China's military advances by leap and bonds, it doesn't really matter.
I think the United States is now adopting a strategy of turning Taiwan into a “porcupine”. But do they really believe Taiwan could be such a powerful porcupine? I doubt about it, but it serves their interest to show that what they’re supporting a so-called democracy, it serves the interest of the American military industrial complex of selling weapons, why not if it is such a good opportunity? I think it also serve them as kind of bargaining chips in this ever sophisticated relationship between China and the United States.
I think Americans actually have made some progress through learning from the failures. For example, “decoupling” now looks totally like nonsense. So they called it “de-risking”, which is actually the term borrowed from Von der Leyen. But why do they call it de-risking? Because it sounds okay, more moderate, because decoupling is impossible. But what does de-risking mean? I think they would have to search their own souls to find out, because even de-risking in semiconductors and chips, they would find it increasingly difficult. It's not that we are asking them to do what they don't want to do, it’s the chips manufacturers. They would put pressure on the White House because they're losing Chinese market.
I think the United States is actually having a problem with its One China policy, because internally, we know, people like Richard Haas, the former president of American Council of Foreign Relations, has written an article about how American policy toward China should turn from ambiguity to clarity. But some other scholars disagree with him, because this kind of clarity actually would make the situation more dangerous. Why is this kind of debate happening? I believe that is because the strength of the PRC is growing, because in the past, PRC was weak, that even if they maintained a policy of ambiguity, you don't know what kind of attitude they're having. And you're in doubt, you're constantly guessing. But because mainland’s strength is growing, they're afraid that unless they make it clear that they would defend Taiwan militarily, probably mainland China would launch attack on Taiwan first. But if they make this kind of policy with clarity, some people are afraid this may just invite a preemptive strike from the mainland in the first place. So I think they're now caught in this dilemma.
And look at the American domestic situation. The Biden administration is weak and this kind of bipartisan rivalry is extreme. Economically speaking, it is doing good, but if you listen to Donald Trump, American's whole situation is “carnage”. Liberal democracy has been in steady decline for 17 years. And who did that? Apparently, it has nothing to do with China or Russia. And for Chinese like me, or anybody, it's so appalling to see an American president would ask protesters to take over Capitol Hill. This is unbelievable. This is an eye opener. And this won't even happen in an African country. So putting all this together, how confident are we in a stable American policy toward China on Taiwan? I really have serious doubt.
Rudyard Griffith: You mentioned the debate in American political circles; some Republicans are arguing there should be an explicit US security guarantee extended to Taiwan, similar to an Article 5 type commitment within NATO. What would be Beijing's reaction if that policy came into force? Would that be seen as provocative?
Zhou Bo:Let's first look into the debate about One China policy, or about ambiguity versus clarity. Eventually, they still talk about One China. Why? Because they're actually hollowing out this concept, but they still put it as a big basket, because this would make things easier for them, they can just use endless different explanations to explain what is One China. If you do not say it is One China, then of course that is kind of earthquake for them and for us.
I think we can learn from Nancy Pelosi's visit that we're serious about it. Some people asked me, what would happen if a new American House speaker visit Taiwan. I said I don't know because, certainly we have a Plan A, Plan B, Plan C, but I can guess out of my gut feeling that our response has to be greater. Otherwise, how can we just tell ourselves that we're doing the right thing?
I doubt they would actually openly support Taiwan’s independence in such a manner, but I'm fully confident that Chinese Mainland being stronger now has more means to handle this.
Rudyard Griffith: This debate over American posture towards Taiwan is unfolding within a larger American strategy in the South Pacific, AUKUS. Around that, there is an effort to develop closer security ties with Japan, the Philippines, to a certain extent, South Korea. How is this being perceived by Chinese security officials? Is there a feeling of encroachment here, a feeling of an adversary setting up a concerted opposition against China's rise, China's expansion?
Zhou Bo:Let me start by talking a bit about the American's grand strategy. I believe the fact that the United States is focusing on Asia-Pacific, or what American call Indo-Pacific, is actually a reflection of the fact that American strength has really declined. So that is why you would find American officials talking about importance of allies and partners, because their own strength is not enough; they have to rely on these allies and partners.
You have mentioned all these people and different situations. I believe this, generally speaking, is an American effort to contain China in this region. The problem is, after I read the Indo-Pacific strategy, I found that they have many purposes, but without adequate tools.
No nations are stupid in black-and-white manner. I believe the world has entered into an era that all countries are picking sides with issues rather than with sides. But when it comes to Japan, which has treaty obligation to support the United States should there be a conflict in Taiwan Strait in terms of logistic supply, Japan would have to do that. But for Australia, they talked about it, but it's hard to say. You won't know what a man really wants to do unless it comes to the final moment. If you examine the history of Australia, you would find this country very interesting in that, historically, it always fought other people's wars elsewhere, in Gallipoli, Afghanistan or somewhere far away from continental Australia, except during the Second World War when Japanese bombed Darwin. So this is an interesting country, always fighting other people's war. But now 1/3 of their export goes to China. And yes, they are buying eight submarines. But how important are these eight submarines? It's almost like the submarines in Taiwan, they could complicate decision making in Beijing, but it's not a big deal, because in terms of number of ships, we're already the largest in the world, and these eight submarines will be delivered probably after 10 to 15 years, to say the least. By then, how much stronger the PLA will become? I think this has a lot to do with the Morrison government. Right now, the Albanese government is also making changes. So this whole picture is not so black and white.
The Philippines is interesting, in that President Marcos’ policy toward China seems to be a U-turn from his predecessor. I personally ask myself, why is this? Because President Duterte certainly has curried a lot of favor with China, even if he himself would support the ruling of the tribunal that was in favor of the Philippines. So on this policy issue, he actually did not mention it so often, but he certainly was supportive of the tribunal ruling. But then, knowing this, he just went along to have good relations with China for some other benefits. But when it came to President Marcos, it's difficult for me to understand because I believe there are something to do with his personal background, because of his firmer or stronger connection with the United States and the Filipino military, basically, all the senior officers were more or less trained in the United States. Still, it doesn't make sense to me, because China has never threatened to use force against any of the claimants in the South China Sea.
China actually has laid down three conditions when it might adopt non-peaceful means regarding the Taiwan issue. But on the South China Sea, China has never threatened any other country. So if all of a sudden the Filipino government would open up nine bases for American use, then we would ask, why? This doesn't really make sense. Actually, it would make the Philippines more vulnerable, because if Americans use these as a kind of a forefront battlefields, then, of course, the territories of the Philippines become targets, is that in their interests?
Rudyard Griffith: What are the lessons that Chinese leaders are drawing from the war in Ukraine? There is an argument that part of what provoked Putin into his invasion was a perception on his part of NATO and western powers arming Ukraine, supporting political movements and political actors that were not in Russia's interests, and that ultimately Ukraine was becoming a security risk for Russia because of its proximity to Moscow and other decision making centers in the country. So does China feel similarly that there's a risk here, a pattern that had unfolded in Ukraine could potentially unfold in Taiwan or the South China Sea, is history gonna
Zhou Bo: Well, on the war in Ukraine, I would say if Putin knows what would happen, he probably would adopt a different strategy. Whether that strategy is war or not, I just don't know. But of course, there is a reason why he would have to do this. The truth is actually from all the Soviet and Russian leaders, starting from like Gorbachev to Yeltsin and Putin all warned against nato’s expansion. So he's not the first person to make a warning, but he's the first person to say enough is enough. The Russian military has proven to be extremely resilient, but was not fighting so well in the beginning.
I would not say that this has any direct link with the Taiwan issue, because that actually is recognized by more than 180 countries to be China's internal affair. As I said in the beginning, I believe the Chinese government is still patient. Some people in Washington believe this kind of conflict is inevitable. I actually have some doubts, even by quoting what Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin said himself. I was in last year’s Shangri-La Dialogue. What impressed me most is that he talked about conflict being not imminent, not inevitable. The background is, before his remarks, there were quite a few remarks made by some American generals talking about 2025 scenario or 2027 scenario that Mainland China would definitely launch attacks or so on and so forth. But because America’s secretary of defense should have all the intelligence information to support his argument, so it is important for him to make it clear on such an important meeting.
Some people say Taiwanese people do not want to be integrated with you. And I believe this may not be so true. Before Covid, actually more than 1.5 million Taiwanese people were living in Mainland China, mostly around Shanghai. And that would be more than 6% of the Taiwanese population. What does that mean? If the Chinese Mainland can provide Taiwanese with better opportunities of employment, or making money, these people actually don't care so much to live in a different society with different systems, right? So could Chinese Mainland continue to provide this kind of environment? I believe it is possible. Because first of all, Chinese economy is so integrated with the rest of the world, China has to open up. And China wants to continue to open up. And so long as China continues to opens up while the world is becoming smaller because of globalization, the speed of people's interaction will simply become faster. This kind of integration between Mainland China and Taiwan will also become faster. So it is in this logic, I believe this kind of integration is inevitable. And finally, the Chinese Mainland has never announced a timetable to reunify. So we're still patient. I believe time might just give us the best help in this regard.
Rudyard Griffith: We're coming to the end of our time, so let me just ask some final bigger picture questions. We've talked a lot about China's rise, its status as a civilizational power in the 21st century. To what extent are your colleagues, senior security officials in China, concerned that you now face an adversary in the United States who is trying across a series of domains, military, technological and economic, to prevent China's rise, to thwart your ascension to potentially becoming the world's dominant power. Is that on people's minds or is this more of a western misinterpretation of what your people are actually thinking and what you're actually concerned about?
Zhou Bo:This is really the biggest questions, and out of this question, there could be dozens of smaller questions and each one of them could be extremely important. Let me repeat what I said to some people, that is whether we have entered into a new cold war, for example. My answer is very simple: we won't know until we have avoided a hot war, because this is exactly what happened during the Cold War. Every day people actually were preparing for a hot war, right? But people went through it and had a big relief, okay, we didn't have a hot war, so what happened was a cold war. My argument is, we never know the future and we would only know the future when we have gone through it.
So this kind of question is meaningless, but apparently there are so many different things from this kind of competition between China and the US and the one during the cold war between the two superpowers. I think what happened is that, if you look at China's policy toward the United States, it has been fairly consistent. It didn't change tone much, and the United States would behave like a roller coaster, that's much more difficult to predict. I think that has a lot of things to do with their own mentality, because that country wrongly believe that they're the City upon the Hill. I tell people, where is the city upon the hill? The Parthenon is the only city upon the hill, it is empty, broken.
Recently, Biden repeated how the United States is indispensable. That is right. But every nation is indispensable. In my view, it is indispensable for people to know that there is a small country called The Maldives deep in the Indian Ocean. It is so beautiful. It is so important for human beings to remember that this whole human society is just like a forest that has different fauna and flora, and that is why the world is beautiful. It is fine that the United States has NBA, McDonald, Hollywood, but so what? The Maldivians don't have any of these, but they just know every morning thousands of tourists would come and just tell them how beautiful their country is.
Finally, back to your question in the beginning. So far, China's rise is very peaceful and this is unprecedented in human history. In China's rise of 40 year and plus, the only sacrifice we made is four soldiers on our side and 20 Indian soldiers on the other side, because of a clash along the border. But it is interesting because they were not shooting at each other, they were fighting physically with each other. The two modern militaries were fighting each other in a manner found in the Stone Age. Why is that? War is not popular, and people from both side know that in any circumstances, we should not shoot at each other.
So back to your question, China's rise is peaceful and probably in less than 10 years’ time, China may become the largest economy in the world. This then would be unprecedented in human history to see a country reaching the Apogee of fame, of glory, without firing a bullet. This still stands. We didn't find a bullet. How unbelievable that is. In human history, people gave all kind of reasons or justifications for all kinds of war. But eventually, who remember all these reasons that have caused people to die? Nobody gives a damn about the reason. Look at the United States, how many people have died because of them? They may give reasons, but people died.
China has made a difference. The Chinese military is remarkable overseas in that it only commits itself to humanitarian operations, be it peacekeeping, counterpiracy or disaster relief. As an ex-serviceman, as a veteran, my hope for my country is China continues to rise peacefully and China's PLA will only conduct humanitarian operations overseas. In that way, you just provide assistance to people around the world. You're not killing anyone. For a country that rises to the top of the world, and for its military to behave so mildly overseas, isn't the world lucky to have such a power? So my hope is, I don't know whether the world would become more beautiful, but I hope with China's rise, China can actually make the world safer.
Rudyard Griffith: Zhou Bo, those are great words for us to end this fascinating conversation on. I really appreciate your time coming to us from China to have this conversation with us today. It's an important one and your messages are heard and received. And let's keep these dialogues going because I think that's really what is important for us to do is to have conversations, to expose each other to different ideas, and through those ideas come conversations, and through conversations hopefully come understanding. So thank you for your contributions today.
Zhou Bo: Thank you, Rudyard, for this conversation.
告发/反应
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